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THE RIGHTS AND STATUS OF SURETIES IN
BANKRUPTCY CASES OF CONTRACTORS
HARRY S. GLEICK*
C ONTROVERSIES arising over the rights of sureties upon the default
of contractors, particularly on public work projects, have plagued the
courts for many years. There is a tremendous amount of case law on the
rights, inter se, of contractors, sureties, federal and state governments,
and assignees of contractors.1 In many instances, the defaulting contrac-
tors have trustees in bankruptcy whose rights also become involved in
this litigation. Indeed, trustees have been drawn into litigation on oc-
casions where it was ascertained ultimately that nothing was due the
bankrupt estates. With the increasing number of governmental contracts,
litigation can only increase, and it is rare indeed that the legal and
practical complications arising from the default of a contractor may be
resolved readily. While this article discusses several decisions adjudicat-
ing such problems and, in particular, analyzes the problems as they reach
the bankruptcy court, a consideration of the rights of the respective
parties in bankruptcy litigation necessarily requires some consideration
of their rights as determined in non-bankruptcy cases. It must be borne
in mind, of course, that, in considering the respective rights of bankruptcy
litigants, state law controls the nature and extent of a taxpayer's property
rights and the validity of liens,2 whereas the Federal Bankruptcy Act
governs the distribution of assets of a bankrupt estate.,
I. TE OBLIGATION OF THE SURIETY
Attendant to almost every substantial construction contract, whether
the obligee be a governmental body or a private corporation, is the re-
quirement that the contractor furnish the obligee with a surety bond or
bonds. A single project may be covered by both a payment bond for the
protection of laborers and materialmen and a performance bond war-
ranting completion within the contract period for the protection of the
obligee; the Miller Act requires both for federal government work.4
Member of the Missouri Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable 'asdt-
ance afforded by Lawrence Sanders of the Missouri Bar in the preparation of this article.
1. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 236 (1947).
2. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960); Aquilino v. United States,
363 US. 509 (1960); In the Matter of Komfo Prods. Corp., 247 F. Supp. 229, 233 (E.D.
Pa. 1965).
3. American Sur. Co. v. Sampsell, 327 US. 269 (1946).
4. Miller Act § 1(a), 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a) (1964). In some instances
a single document may combine both functions. Prior to this statute although only one bond
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Prior to the surety's issuance of the bonds, the contractor generally
is required to sign an application containing many conditions; this
writing becomes part of the agreement -between- the surety and the
contractor. The construction contract, which is the subject of the surety's
bond or bonds, is regarded as part of the surety's undertaking.5 Accord-
ingly, sureties are certain to protect themselves, so far as possible, by
indemnity agreements. Upon the contractor's default, the surety itself
may complete the contract, or it may employ others to do so, in order
to protect itself against the claims of the obligee. In each case the
rights of the respective parties depend to a great extent upon the wording
of the obligation. For example, where the bond is a payment bond condi-
tioned upon the payment of laborers and materialmen, significant au-
thority indicates that, as against unpaid laborers and materialmen, the
surety is not entitled to monetary amounts accrued in current operations
and retained by the obligee.' In addition, the priority of laborers and
materialmen in such a case usually obtains even where the contractor
has assigned his rights in the accrued amounts to the surety.7
II. THE RIGHT OF SUBROGATION
When a default occurs because the contractor either voluntarily or
involuntarily has ceased to perform, the obligee may be holding two
characteristically different funds. Most contracts provide for the obligee
to withhold a certain amount of the contract price, termed the retained
percentage or the retainage, in order to assure completion of the contract.
In addition, since most contracts provide for periodic payments to be
made during the progress of the construction, it is not unusual for the
obligee, at the time of the default, to be holding a certain amount of
unexpended moneys currently accrued. When a contractor becomes a
was required, both performance and payment had to be covered. Act of Feb. 24, 1905, ch.
778, 33 Stat. 811.
5. "It is a fundamental rule of construction that where the contract which is the sub-
ject of the performance bond is referred to in the latter . . . the contract is to be regarded
as a part of the undertaking of the surety under the bond." Home Indem. Co. v. F. H.
Donovan Painting Co., 325 F.2d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 1963). See Prairie State Bank v. United
States, 164 U.S. 227, 231 (1896); Triangle Elec. Supply Co. v. Mojave Elec. Co., 234 F. Supp.
293, 308 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
6. E.g., American Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133 (1935); Mary-
land Cas. Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 65 F.2d 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 702
(1933); City of St. Johns v. Hudson-Howe, Inc., 309 Mich. 240, 15 N.W.2d 147 (1944).
Contra, e.g., Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 282 Mass. 100, 184 N.E. 434 (1933);
Globe Indem. Co. v. Peterson-McCaslin Lumber Co., 72 Nev. 282, 303 P.2d 414 (1956);
Robinson Mfg. Co. v. Blaylock, 192 N.C. 407, 135 S.E. 136 (1926).
7. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cheaney, 55 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932).
Contra, e.g., Commercial Cas.:Ins. Co. v. Murphy, supra note 6.
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bankrupt, the trustee, invested with title to rights of action arising upon
contracts,s may be expected to make a claim for all amounts then owing
to the contractor.
When the contractor defaults, leaving obligations owing and unpaid,
or work to be completed and paid for in the future, or both, the surety
is faced with existing and future obligations to the obligee and, hence,
has what is generally termed a right of subrogation to the retainage
and to the money currently owing.'
Subrogation has been defined as "the substitution of another person in
the place of the creditor, to whose rights he succeeds in relation to the
debt."'1 It is difficult, however, to apply the textbook definition so as to
protect the surety in those cases in which it is entitled to protection, and
this has resulted in the use of such terms as "equitable right through
subrogation," 1. "equitable lien,"' "equitable assignee by subrogation,"'
and "trust or equitable claim."' 4 Sustaining the rights of the surety ac-
cording to the standard definition of subrogation leads to many difficul-
ties.' 5 For example, it certainly cannot follow that the surety is merely
subrogated to the claims of the contractor, since a defaulting con-
tractor ordinarily has no claim.'" Nor can it be said that the surety in
every case is subrogated to the rights of the laborers and materialmen,T
for, under the Miller Act,"3 such parties can assert no claim against the
8. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6), 52 StaL 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § l10(a)(6) (1964).
9. "That a stipulation in a building contract for the retention, until the completion of
the work, of a certain portion of the consideration, is as much for the indemnity of him
who may be guarantor of the performance of the work as for him for whom the work is
to be performed; that it raises an equity in the surety in the fund to be created ... is
amply sustained by authority." Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 US. 227, 233 (1895).
See text accompanying notes SO-S2 infra.
10. 3 Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Sth ed. Rawle's 3d rev. 1914).
11. Danais v. Al. De Matteo Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp. 874, 376 (DN.H. 1952). "This
right to subrogation is not dependent upon the contractual provisions found in the appli-
cation for the bond. It arises independently of contract by operation of law under familiar
principles of equity'." Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Federal Nat'l Bank, 112 F2d 692, 695 (10th
Cir. 1940). (Footnote omitted.)
12. Exchange State Bank v. Federal Sur. Co., 23 F.2d 485 (Sth Cir. 1923); Danais v.
Al. De Mlatteo Constr. Co., supra note 11, at 876.
13. Belknap Hardware & Afg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co, 271 Fed. 144, 149 (6th
Cir. 1921); see note 36 infra.
14. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Grand Ave. State Bank, 223 F.2d 513, 513 (5th Cir. 1955).
15. This is particularly true in situations involving taa liens. See, e.g., Phoenix Indem.
Co. v. Earle, 21S F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1955) (subordinating surety's claim to Government's
perfected tax lien).
16. See Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 232 (1896).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Mlunsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947); text accompanying
notes 42-44 infra.
18. 49 Stat. 793 (1935), as amended, 40 US.C. §§ 270a-d (1964).
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Government. 9 Moreover, it cannot be said that in every instance the
surety must rely upon a claim against the obligee,2° since the obligee,
recognizing its obligation, may have paid the fund to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy or into the registry of the court.21 Difficulties also arise in cases
where the surety is making a claim for the purpose of protecting itself
against funds to be paid out in the future. The doctrine of subrogation,
applied strictly, entitles the claimant only to reimbursement for funds
already expended; therefore, if the surety waits until the funds have
actually been disbursed, it may suffer a loss against which it should be
protected at the time of the default.
When the contractor becomes the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding,
the duty may devolve upon the trustee, either because the funds are
within the jurisdiction or control of the bankruptcy court, or because
of the remote possibility that the bankrupt estate may have some equity
in the funds, to assist the court in adjudicating the rights of the respective
parties.22 The Bankruptcy Act itself does not provide clarification of the
various subrogation problems that may be involved in the proceeding.
The sole reference in the act is a provision for the subrogation of the
claim of a secured creditor under certain conditions, 23 but this only gives
19. State statutes provide similar governmental immunity. E.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 90,
§ 11 (1957); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 37-12-1 (1956). "If the [Government] ... were
obligated to pay laborers and materialmen unpaid by a contractor, the surety who dis-
charged that obligation could claim subrogation. But nothing is more clear than that laborers
and materialmen do not have enforceable rights against the [Government] . . . for their
compensation." United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947).
20. Ordinarily, however, where the surety performs the balance of the contract, its right
of subrogation is "a right to resort to the securities and remedies" which the obligee could
assert against the contractor if the retainage does not satisfy the contractor's obligation.
One such remedy is the right to appropriate the retainage. Prairie State Bank v. United
States, 164 U.S. 227, 232 (1896).
21. See, e.g., Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962). Of course, the obligee
may have rights of its own to assert against the contractor, such as set off claims, even
though the completed work has been accepted by the obligee. E.g., United States v. Munsey
Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947); see note 41 infra.
22. Bankruptcy Act § 47a, 52 Stat. 860 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 75(a) (1964).
23. "Whenever a creditor whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured, in whole
or in part, by the individual undertaking of a person, fails to prove and file that claim,
that person may do so in the creditor's name, and he shall be subrogated to the rights of
the creditor, whether the claim has been filed by the creditor or by him in the creditor's
name, to the extent that he discharges the undertaking except that in absence of an agree-
ment to the contrary, he shall not be entitled to any dividend until the amount paid to
the creditor on the undertaking plus the dividends paid to the creditor from the bankrupt
estate on the claim equal the amount of the entire claim of the creditor. Any excess re-
ceived by the creditor shall be held by him in trust for such person." Bankruptcy Act § 571,
76 Stat. 570 (1962), 11 U.S.C. § 93(i) (1964). See 3 Collier, Bankruptcy II 57.21 (14th ed.
1964).
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a right to file a general claim and, for practical purposes, affords no
substantial relief.
A. The Prairie State Bank Case
Seventy years ago, the Supreme Court, in Prairie State Bank v. United
States,2  was confronted with a dispute between a surety and a bank for
the retainage held by the Government as security for the full performance
of a building contract. The contractor assigned its rights in the fund to
the bank to secure past and future advances. Upon the contractor's
default, the surety, pursuant to its obligation on its performance bond,5
assumed the contractor's obligations and completed the contract. The
Court held that the surety had an equitable right of subrogation, based
upon the rights which the Government might assert against the retainage
for the purpose of completing the contract,2- to indemnify itself against
loss, 27 and that this right was superior to the assignee bank's claim arising
out of the attempted transfer of the fund. The Court stated that the con-
tractor had attempted to transfer to the bank a right which he did not
possess25 since a claim against the Government, i.e., the contractor's
right to reclaim the retainage upon full performance, is not transferable.'
24. 164 U.S. 227 (1S96).
25. No statute then existed requiring a payment bond for the benefit of laborers and
materialmen on federal government work. Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River
Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144, 146 (6th Cir. 1921); see note 4 supra and accompanying text.
26. See note 20 supra.
27. See note 9 supra.
28. "[]t is manifest that if the transaction ... by which the Prairie Banl: acquired
its alleged lien on the fund possessed the effect contended for by the bank, it would neces-
sarily operate to alter and impair rights acquired by the surety under the orpinal contract.
[The contractor] . .. could not transfer to the bank any greater rights in the fund than
[he himself] ... possessed. [1is] ... rights were subordinate to those of the United
States and the sureties." 164 US. at 239-40.
29. Id. at 230; see Rev. Stat. § 3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (19G4);
Martin v. National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 58S, 594 (1937); Belkmap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v.
Ohio River Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144, 148-49 (6th Cir. 1921). Recognizing that such a daim
could not be transferred, the Prairie State Bank had based its claim on an equitable lien
theory. The Court ruled not only that the surety, which had no knowledge of the attempted
transfer to the bank, was subrogated to the Government's rights in the retainage, but also
that the surety's rights arose upon entry into the contract rather than upon as-umption
of the contractor's obligations; accordingly, the surety's rights were superior to whatever
equity the bank may have acquired. 164 U.S. at 230.
Where a surety takes an assignment of the contractor's claim for the fund against the
Government, the assignment, though invalid against the Government, would entitle the
surety to prevail in a contest with the contractor. United States v. Munsey Trust Co, 332
US. 234, 237 n.1 (1947).
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B. The Henningsen Case
Not too many years thereafter, the Supreme Court, in Henningsen V.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,30 applied the same doctrine in a case
involving a payment bond. The Court held that, because the surety, by
making payment upon the contractor's default, released the contractor
from his obligation to pay the workers and materialmen and "to the same
extent released the Government from all equitable obligations to see that
the laborers and supply men were paid,""1 the surety was subrogated to
the right of the contractor to reclaim the fund upon performance of his
contract. The Court, as in Prairie State Bank, 2 made pointed reference to
the fact that the surety company was contractually obligated to make
the payments,3 3 whereas the claimant-bank was a "mere volunteer" in
lending money upon the security of an assignment 4 and, therefore, was
not subrogated to the contractor's rights in the retainage. In Prairie
State Bank, it was the voluntary aspect of the transaction entered into
by the bank that would have defeated a claim by the bank to subrogation
of the Government's rights in the retainage.' The cases have been
contrasted on the basis that in Prairie State Bank the surety had com-
pleted the contract and thereby became entitled to the retainage held as
security by the Government; whereas in Henningsen the contractor him-
self had finished the work, and therefore the surety was subrogated to
the rights of the laborers and materialmen in the fund"' rather than to
30. 208 U.S. 404 (1908).
31. Id. at 410.
32. 164 U.S. at 232.
33. Almost 80 years ago, the Supreme Court stated: "One of the principles lying at the
foundation of subrogation in equity, in addition to the [principle] . . . that the person
seeking this subrogation must have paid the debt, is that he must have done this under
some necessity, to save himself from loss which might arise or accrue to him .... " Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1888).
34. 208 U.S. at 410, 411.
35. However, in a later case, the Supreme Court did not discuss voluntariness (it was
not in issue), stating: "From Prairie State Bank v. United States . . . we have recognized
the peculiarly equitable claim of those responsible for the physical completion of building
contracts to be paid from available moneys ahead of others whose claims come from the
advance of money." United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 240 (1947). (Italics
omitted.) (Citations omitted.) See American Sur. Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366, 368 (10th
Cir. 1958).
36. Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144, 148-49
(6th Cir. 1921). In discussing the Henningsen case, the Belknap court stated: "We are con-
strained to think that the decision necessarily rests upon the existence of this right, as one
entitling these [laborers and materialmen] . . . to priority in payment out of the fund,
and therefore as entitling the surety, as their equitable assignee by subrogation, to the same
priority." Id. at 149. . .
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the Government's right of security.37 It is doubtful, however, that courts
today would accord significant weight to this difference. 5
C. The Mlunsey Trust Co. Case
In 1947, the Supreme Court, in Unitcd States v. .11hnscy Trust Co.,,
held that the Government, despite the asserted rights of a surety under
its payment bond, could set off a claim bearing no relation to the con-
tract in issue against the contractor's claim for the retainage held by the
Government.
Pursuant to statute, the surety had given both a payment and a
performance bond.4" The contractor completed performance of his con-
tract 1 but defaulted in payments to the laborers and materialmen. The
surety, in compliance with its obligation on the payment bond, paid the
balance owing to the workers and materialmen and, therefore, sought to
apply the retainage against the amount it had disbursed; the Government
intended to apply the fund against damages suffered from a subsequent
default of the contractor on an independent transaction. The Court
reasoned that the surety could not be subrogated to the rights of the
laborers and materialmen on the basis of the payment bond12 since, when
the laborers and materialmen were as yet unpaid, they had no enforceable
rights against the Government,43 and the fact that, subsequently, they
were paid by the surety certainly did not provide them with rights not
previously in existence.44 In addition, the Court stated that the only mo-
tive in retaining the fund was to assure completion of the contract on
time,4 and, since it had been so performed, the surety had no right
37. Once the contractor had completed his performance, the element of security no
longer existed; accordingly, if there is no right to be transferred, there can be no right
transferred by subrogation. Id. at 14S-49; see note 29 supra and accompanying text.
.38. "The fact that the contractor may ...fail to complete the contract is entirely
beside the point and does not alter, change, add to or modify the la, of suretyship." United
Pac. Ins. Co. x% First NatI Bank, 222 F. Supp. 243, 249 (D. Ore. 1963).
39. 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
:40. liller Act § 1(a), 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a) (1964).
41. The contractor has the right to reclaim the retainage upon full performance of his
obligations, but, here, the independent claim would simply he set off against the contractor's
claim. United States -v. lunsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 239, 241 nA (1947).
42. The purpose of such a bond contravenes the surety's contention. "[Tihe statutory
provisions requiring a separate bond for payment of laborers and materialmen were enacted
for their benefit, not to the detriment of the government. It is the surety who is required
to take risk. We have no warrant to increase risks of the government." Id. at 243-44. See
American Sur. Co. v. Hlinds, 260 F.2d 366, 363 (10th Cir. 1953).
43. See note 19 supra.
44. 332 U.S. at 241-42.
45. Id. at 243. At one point, the Court had acceded to the surety's assumption that the
retainage was as much to assure the Government that the contractor would perform his
19661
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which could be based on its performance bond to the Government's rights
in the retainage 6
In reasoning that the Government was a secured creditor with the
right to retain the fund for its set off claim4 7 so that the surety never
became entitled to the retainage,4" the Court used language which was
broader than the facts or finding required, thus fostering considerable
confusion.49 Doubt centered on whether the surety would be relegated
to its subordinate position if the Government were "a mere stakeholder
and had no rights of its own to assert."5 ° Some courts sought to limit
the Munsey holding to the narrow extent of its facts, 1 whereas the deci-
sion has also been applied in situations where the Government was not
a claimant. 2
III. PRIORITY BETWEEN SURETY AND TRUSTEE
In 1962, the Supreme Court, in Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co.,50 at-
tempted to resolve the confusion. 4 The surety and a trustee in bank-
ruptcy of the defaulting contractor vied for a fund which the Government
had turned over to the trustee. Since performance was completed by a
second contractor, the surety's claim was based on the payment bond
under which it had paid the original contractor's debts to the laborers
and materialmen. The majority seemed to subrogate the surety's rights
contract by paying the laborers and materialmen as by completing the work within the
contractual period. Id. at 241. However, this assumption was permitted solely for purposes
of the contention, which the Court negated, that the surety was subrogated to the rights
of the laborers and materiamen. Id. at 243.
46. Here the Court discarded the assumption that the retainage was to assure perfor-
mance of all the contractor's obligations, see note 45 supra, and reasoned that, since per-
formance was completed on time, no rights in the fund accrued to the surety on the basis
of its payment bond. See 332 U.S. at 243. In 1958, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also
subordinated a claim by a surety under its payment bond, but the court did not consider
whether the surety's position would be the same if it were claiming under its performance
bond. American Sur. Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366, 368 n.5 (10th Cir. 1958).
47. 332 U.S. at 240.
48. "[W]e are not prepared to apply law relating to security to unappropriated sums
which exist only as a claim." Id. at 243.
49. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366 (10th Cir, 1958) ; Phoenix Indem.
Co. v. Earle, 218 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1955). See generally Comment, 31 Fordham L. Rev,
161 (1962); Note, 71 Yale LJ. 1274 (1962).
50. 332 U.S. at 240.
51. See, e.g., In re Cummins Constr. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 193, 200-01 (D. Md. 1948);
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 297 N.Y. 31, 36, 74 NE.2d
266, 227 (1947).
52. E.g., American Sur. Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1958).
53. 371 U.S. 132 (1962).
54. Differing results among some circuit courts of appeals prompted the Court to hear
this appeal. Id. at 135.
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to the Government's right to use the retained fund to pay laborers and
materialmen,56 although it appeared that the Government's obligation
was moral rather than legal.W The Court recognized the difference be-
tween a surety incurring loss by paying the contractor's debts rather
than by completing performance of the contractP8 but stated that the
same rules should apply to both situations."' In reaffirming the principles
of Prairie State Bank and Henningsen,° the Court limited its holding in
55. The Court stated that it was "an already established doctrine that a surety who
completes a contract has an 'equitable right' to indemnification out of a retained fund such
as the one claimed by the surety in the present case." Id. at 133. However, the Court did
not seem to regard as significant the fact that the Government no longer had poze:zion of
the fund, although the concurring opinion did mention this factor. Id. at 143.
Although Bank:ruptcy Act § 64, 52 Stat. S74 (193S), as amended, 11 US.C. § 104 (1964),
does not prescribe priority to a surety's claim, the Court agreed with the contention of the
surety that, prior to adjudication, it had a property interest in the fund so that title did
not vest in the trustee. "Onurership of property rights before bankruptcy is one thing;
priority of distribution in bankruptcy of property that has passed unencumbered into a
bankrupt's estate is quite another. Property interests in a fund not owned by a bankrupt
at the time of adjudication, whether complete or partial, legal or equitable, mortgages, liens,
or simple priority of rights, are of course not a part of the bankrupt's property and do
not vest in the trustee." 371 U.S. at 135. See United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363
U.S. 522 (1960); Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 27S U.S. 149 (1923).
56. "We . ..hold . . . that the Government had a right to use the retained fund to
pay laborers and materialmen; that the laborers and materialmen had a right to be paid
out of the fund; that the contractor, had he completed his job and paid his laborers and
materialmen, would have become entitled to the fund; and that the surety, having paid
the laborers and materialmen, is entitled to the benefit of all these rights to the extent
necessary to reimburse it." 371 U.. at 141. (Footnote omitted.) However, the concurring
opinion stressed the fact that the Government was not legally obligated to pay the laborer
and materialmen and treated the majority opinion as subrogating the surety to the rights
of such laborers and materialmen. Id. at 142; see note 63 infra. In fact, subrogating the
surety to the Government's rights appears inconsistent with the Court's reiteration of the
doctrine that "a surety who pays the debt of another is entitled to all the rights of the
person he paid to enforce his right to be reimbursed." 371 US. at 137. (Footnote omitted.)
57. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
58. 371 US. at 133.
59. "[Tihe same equitable rules as to subrogation and property interests in a retained
fund . . . exist whether a surety completes a contract or whether, though not called upon
to complete the contract, it pays the laborers and materialmen." Id. at 139. See Henningsen
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 203 US. 404 (1903); Prairie State Bank v. United States,
164 U.S. 227 (196); Martin v. National Sur. Co., 35 F.2d 135 (3th Cir. 1936), afi'd, 3 0
U.S. 589 (1937).
60. 371 U.S. at 139-41. The Court stated: "[T]he equitable rights of a surety declared
in the Prairie Bank case as to sureties who complete the performance of a contract were
expressly recognized and approved in Mlunsey, and the Henningsen rule as to sureties who
had not completed the contract but had paid laborers was not mentioned. Henningen v-as
not even cited in the Munsey opinion. We hold that Munsey left the rule in Prairie Bank:
and Henningsen undisturbed. We cannot say that such a firmly established rule was so
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Munsey Trust Co.: "We held that the Government could exercise the
well-established common-law right of debtors to offset claims of their
own against their creditors. This was all we held."'"
Three concurring Justices, 2 after stating that Prairie State Bank and
Henningsen might not apply where the Government has relinquished
the fund to the court,63 asserted that the instant decision should have
been grounded on the theory of an equitable lien based upon the assign-
ment of moneys contained in the indemnity agreement.0 4 However, sus-
taining the surety on the basis of an assignment is not always readily
amenable to support.0
The concurring Justices, without mentioning the word "trust," seemed
to conclude that the fund, even in the hands of the trustee, was subject
to a trust arising out of the moral obligation of the Government to see
that the laborers and materialmen were paid."0 Following such reasoning,
the Justices agreed with the majority that the surety was entitled to the
entire fund because the debts owing to the laborers and materialmen
constituted an amount greater than the existing retainage."7
One writer believes that the Pearlman case has settled problems be-
tween Government and surety, with the caveat that leading cases today
seem to spring from Miller Act or Capehart' 8 bonds. 9 But this is wish-
ful thinking.
casually overruled." Id. at 140-41. (Italics omitted.) (Footnotes omitted.) The concurring
opinion stated that consideration of the Prairie State Bank and Henningsen cases was not
even necessary to a determination of the Munsey case. Id. at 143.
61. Id. at 140.
62. Mr. Justice Clark wrote the opinion, with Justices Douglas and Brennan joining In
the concurrence.
63. Id. at 143 (concurring opinion). As previously stated, the concurring Justices treated
the majority's opinion as subrogating the surety to the rights of the laborers and material-
men, see note 56 supra, and pointed out that neither in Prairie State Bank nor in Henning-
sen did the Court find that these persons had any rights against the Government. 371 U.S.
at 143; see note 66 infra.
64. See 371 U.S. at 143 & n., 144 (concurring opinion). The concurring Justices agreed
with Mr. Justice Cardozo in Martin v. National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937), that Prairie
State Bank and Henningsen should not be enlarged and that the "narrower" ground of
assignment was the better course. 371 U.S. at 144.
65. See text accompanying notes 88-90 & 96-98 infra.
66. See 371 U.S. at 143-44 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Clark, relying on Munsey
Trust Co., explicitiy rejected any contention that the Government was legally obligated to
the laborers and materialmen and stated that, "since the laborers and materialmen have no
right against the funds, it follows as clear as rain that the surety could have none." Id. at
142 (concurring opinion).
67. See id. at 141-42; id. at 144 (concurring opinion).
68. See Capehart Housing Act, 69 Stat. 646 (1955), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 17481
(1964).
69. Clark, The Competition Between Surety and Trustee in Bankruptcy for Contract
Balances, 32 Ins. Counsel J. 656, 658 (1965).
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A 1963 Court of Claims case,7" involving payment and performance
bonds given under the Miller Act, followed the Pearlman decision. Upon
the contractor's default, the surety completed the work, and the trustee
in bankruptcy of the contractor intervened in the dispute between the
surety and the Government and claimed the balance held by the Govern-
ment.71 The trustee maintained that the surety had no claim under the
payment bond, on the theory that a prerequisite to the right of sub-
rogation is that all payments have been made, and, here, at least one
claim had not been settled. However, the amount of the withheld balance
was considerably less than the sums already expended by the surety. The
surety prevailed on the ground that its equities were greater than the
trustee's even though the surety had not completely fulfilled its obligations
to the laborers and materialmen. 2 There are holdings, however, to the
effect that the surety's right to subrogation depends upon the total com-
pletion of payments required under the bond, 3 but that obligations
arising after the date of the bond impose no bar to subrogation."t
Although laborers and materialmen merely have the status of general
creditors and are not in a position to assert priority claims in the bank-
ruptcy court,75 the surety is not thereby deprived of its right of sub-
rogation and of priority over the trustee. This was decided on the theory
that the Government is unwilling to have laborers and materialmen go
unpaid, and that the Government, by retaining the fund, can insure such
payment.7 It may be assumed that, where the Government relinquishes
70. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. Ci. 361, 365, 319 F.2d S93, S95 (1963).
71. The trustee contended first that the surety induced the contractor, through a "bud-
ness arrangement," to default and that this wrong defeated the default. The court found
this allegation to be contrary to the facts and stated that, even if it were true, the conten-
tion was "of no legal significance." Ibid.
72. An alleged materialman had filed suit on the bond in the district court. The court
of appeals recognized that this claimant, if successful, could collect on his judgment only
from the surety. Since the surety's motion for summary judgment was granted, the court
obviously did not deem significant the fact of whether or not an unpaid materialman did,
in fact, exist; therefore, the surety had a right of subrogation for the amounts already paid
to the laborers and materialmen, to the extent that the retainage would satisfy such dis-
bursements. See id. at 365-66, 319 F.2d at S95-96.
73. United States v. National Sur. Co., 254 U.S. 73 (1920); see, e.g., In the Matter of
Buildice Co., 146 F. Supp. 911 (ND. Ill. 1956); In re Flotation Syss., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 693
(S.D. Cal. 1946).
74. In the Matter of Buildice Co., supra note 73.
75. Materialmen have no right to assert a claim based upon subrogation in the ban-
ruptcy court, since their claim is on the bond. In re Flotation Syss., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 693,
701-02 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
76. Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 99, 103, 169 F. Supp. 945, 947
(1959). The Government, in exacting the contractor's promise to pay the laborers and
materialmen and in requiring a payment bond, "acquired a right against the contractor that
they should be paid." Ibid. The court suggested that the bondsman's insolvency would allow
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the fund to the trustee, the same result will be reached.Y There is no
valid reason for treating amounts already paid by a surety on a different
basis than amounts which the surety is obligated to pay; this is partic-
ularly true where it appears that the amounts available will be in-
sufficient for complete reimbursement. In fact, in Pearlman, the Court
seemed to assume that the Government still retained the fund, although,
in fact, it had already been turned over to the trustee.78
In light of the foregoing problems, perhaps a new definition of the
term "subrogation" is needed. It may be, as suggested by one writer,
that definitive legislation in this field, such as we have in bankruptcy law,
is required;7 but the difficulty is that, after almost every amendment to
the Bankruptcy Act, we have been plagued with new problems and
perplexing decisions.
Subject to certain limitations, the right of subrogation should extend
to amounts currently withheld, as well as to retainages, to the extent
necessary to reimburse the surety,"° although some cases have emphasized
that the right to the retainage originates from the date of the contract,8 1
when the claim to current funds later withheld is not in existence. 2 Of
course, in the rare event that an amount in excess of the surety's claim
the Government to pay the laborers and materialmen out of the witheld moneys, id. at 103,
169 F. Supp. at 947 (dictum); therefore, the surety, by paying the laborers and material-
men, satisfied the contractor's obligations to these persons as general creditors and to the
Government as a preferred creditor "because of its possession of funds which could be used
as an offset against the contractor," and it was satisfaction of this latter obligation that
entitled the surety to be subrogated to the funds held as security by the Government. Id. at
103, 169 F. Supp. at 947.
77. See Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962).
78. See note 55 supra.
79. Cross, Federal Tax Claims: The Contractor's Surety and Suppliers, ABA Proceedings,
Insurance, Negligence & Compensation Law 57, 79 (1957).
80. Lacy v. Maryland Cas. Co., 32 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1929). The court reasoned that the
surety's equity arises because of his obligation to perform upon the contractor's default, and
that, upon performing, the surety is subrogated by equity to the obligee's rights against the
contractor. Since the obligee is entitled to apply the amounts withheld towards completion
of the contract, "it necessarily follows that the surety . . . is entitled to the moneys unpaid
so far as necessary to reimburse his loss." Id. at 51. The court supported its reasoning by
relying on the principles of the surety's subrogation to the "securities and remedies" of the
obligee in Prairie State Bank, see note 20 supra, despite recognition of the fact that only a
retained percentage was there involved. 32 F.2d at 51. The court also noted that, in granting
recovery to the surety in the Henningsen case, the Supreme Court made no distinction be-
tween retainage and current amounts withheld. Id. at 52.
81. Gray v. Travelers Indem. Co., 280 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1960); United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1952) ; see note 29 supra.
82. Gray v. Travelers Indem. Co., 280 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1960); Town of River Junc-
tion v. Maryland Cas. Co., 110 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 634 (1940); see
United Pac. Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 222 F. Supp. 243, 249-50 (D. Ore. 1963).
[Vol. 34
RIGHTS OF SURETIES
should develop in the retainage and current account funds, that surplus
belongs to the trustee of the bankrupt contractor, and on that ground
the bankruptcy court may retain control of the funds.3
Restriction on Subrogation
There is a definite restriction on the surety's right of subrogation. Not
only does the doctrine offer no protection to the surety against the claims
of those whom its bond was written to protect, but also the surety's
rights under the doctrine cannot share on a parity with such claims. 4 The
courts feel that success of such a claim in bankruptcy would effectuate
the result "that the statutory security be whittled down" in contravention
of the bond's purpose.-" However, this does not deprive the surety of its
rights to priority as an assignee of wage priority claimants," with the
reservation that amounts paid by the surety after default and abandon-
ment by the contractor, not being obligations of the bankrupt, cannot
be allowed as priority wage claims.67
IV. SuRETY's RIGHTS UNDER ASSIGNMENTS
A. Against the Trustee
In the contract between the contractor and the surety, it is indeed rare
that there are no clauses assigning to the surety the contractor's rights to
moneys due under the contract and to the equipment that the surety
will require to complete the contract upon the contractor's default. In
addition, the contractor usually agrees that, upon default, the surety may
use the contractor's premises if necessary to the completion of the
contract. These clauses raise various problems when bankruptcy inter-
venes.
The position of sureties who rely upon assignments is ordinarily far
weaker than the position of those who rely upon their right of sub-
83. Id. at 250; Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 99, 103, 169 F. Supp.
945, 947 (1959).
S4. American Sur. Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U.S. 269, 272-73 (1946); Home Indem. Co. v.
F. H. Donovan Painting Co., 325 F.2d S70, 874-75 (8th Cir. 1963); In re Flotation Syss,
Inc, 65 F. Supp. 698, 702 (S.D. Cal. 1946); see cases cited notes 6 & 7 supra and accom-
panying text. The Supreme Court, in Sampsell, relying upon American Sur. Co. v. Westing-
house Elec. Mlfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133 (1935), reasoned that the surety, by paying some of the
obligations, should not be allowed to claim subrogation or indemnification for such pay-
ments, because the bond vwas intended to protect all the laborers and materialmen since they
would have been paid if the contractor had not defaulted; therefore, until all are paid in
full, the surety's claim will be postponed. 327 U.S. at 273, 274.
85. American Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Alfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133, 139 (1935).
86. Shropshire, Woodliff & Co. v. Bush, 204 US. 186 (1907); see Banh-uptcy Act
§ 64a(2), 70 Stat. 725 (1956), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1964).
87. Home Indem. Co. v. F. H. Donovan Painting Co., 325 F.2d 870, 373 (3th Cir. 1963).
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rogation. 8 Provisions for assignments to surety companies must be con-
sidered as constituting security agreements. 0 Therefore, in situations
where intervening assignments to banks or others have been properly
perfected under state law prior to perfection by the sureties, the rights
of the sureties are subject to the rights of such intervening creditors.
In Uniform Commercial Code states, bankruptcy courts will be re-
quired, most assuredly, to determine the respective priorities of secured
creditors to a greater extent than they have in the past.
As might be expected, occasions have arisen where assignments pro-
vided for in the original agreements between contractors and sureties,
and perfected according to state recordation statutes, have not resulted in
payments to the sureties until sometime within the four month period
preceding bankruptcy; and, accordingly, bankruptcy trustees have
claimed that such payments constitute recoverable preferences. This
theory is untenable.
A chattel mortgage or other security given to a surety company within
four months prior to bankruptcy to strengthen its position as against an
insolvent contractor is voidable where all the elements of a recoverable
preference are present, even though the surety was otherwise protected
by a general assignment of assets in the bond application."0 Although
Section 60a(6) of the Bankruptcy Act, which covers the subject of
preferences, states: "The recognition of equitable liens where available
means of perfecting legal liens have not been employed is hereby declared
to be contrary to the policy of this section,"' 91 it is clear that this provision
does not make voidable the rights of a surety under the doctrine of sub-
rogation. 2 Under the holdings that equitable liens arise at the time of
the contract,9 3 there is, under the theory of subrogation, no recoverable
preference as to payments obtained by the surety within the four month
88. In re L. H. Duncan & Sons, 127 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1942) (by implication). Where
the surety pays claims of laborers that are priority claims under Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2),
70 Stat. 725 (1956), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1964), and takes an assignment of those claims,
there is-no problem. Shropshire, Woodliff & Co. v. Bush, 204 U.S. 186 (1907); see text
accompanying notes 86 & 87 supra. However, when a surety is claiming superior rights both
through subrogation and under an assignment, if he is not entitled to recovery on the sub-
rogation theory, he will have to establish that the alleged assignment has been perfected
according to applicable state law. See Danais v. M. De Matteo Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp.
874, 877 (D.N.H. 1952) (dictum).
1 89. Street v. Pacific Indem. Co., 61 F,2d 106, 108-09 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 297
U.S. 718 (1936); In the Matter of Komfo Prods. Corp., 247 F. Supp. 229, 233 (E.D.
Pa. 1965).
90. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hinshaw, 309 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1962).
91: Bankruptcy Act § 60a(6), 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(6) (1964).
92. Danais v. M. De Matteo Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp. 874 (D.N.H. 1952).
93. Case cited note 82 supra; see note 29 supra.
[Vol. 34
RIGHTS OF SURETIES
period?4 And where a contractor, within the four month period, executes
contracts in an attempt to complete a pending project, the surety on the
bond does not obtain a recoverable preference by acquiring, at the time,
a security interest5
Some trustees have asserted rights superior to the rights of ordinary
assignees of the bankrupt contractor, basing their claims on Section 70c
of the Bankruptcy Act," the so-called "strong arm clause." Only if
the surety's rights have been perfected in accordance with state law,
both as to property covered by the assignment and as to after-acquired
property, will the surety prevail over the trustee. It is clear that, when
a surety is compelled to rely upon an assignment, whether it be of
money or property, compliance with state law governing the perfection
of assignments must be shown. 8
Sureties seek to protect themselves in their contracts by clauses which
authorize them to apply surplus funds acquired on completion of one
project to their losses on another project. Such an attempt must rest
strictly upon orthodox contract law; it cannot be bottomed upon sub-
rogation. Nor in this instance will the assignment theory prevail against
a trustee in bankruptcy, for it is rare that the surety's rights under assign-
ment have been protected to this extent. Ordinarily, a payment so applied
by a surety within four months prior to bankruptcy will constitute a
recoverable preference.
A further contractual device by which sureties seek to protect them-
selves in the event of the contractor's default is a clause providing the
94. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sweeney, SO F2d 235, 238-39 (8th Cir. 1935);
London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of America v. Endres, 290 Fed. 93, 102-03 (8th Cir. 1923);
United Pac. Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 222 F. Supp. 243, 249 (D. Ore. 1963).
95. Ibid.
96. "The trustee may have the benefit of all defenses available to the bankrupt as against
third persons, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and other pzruonal
defenses; and a waiver of any such defense by the bankrupt after bankruptcy sihall not
bind the trustee. The trustee, as to all property, vhether or not coming into pocezion or
control of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien
by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of
such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon
by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually e.'dsts." Bankruptcy Act § 7c,
66 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964).
97. Rosenbaum v. Century Indem. Co., 16S F.2d 917 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
SS5 (194S); In the Matter of Collins & Kiser Constr. Co., 204 F. Supp. 42, 45 (S.D. Iowa),
aff'd sub nom. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hlnshaw, 309 F.2d E05 (8th Cir. 1962); State
v. A. D. Ingalls, Inc., 105 N.E. 244, 247-48, 197 A.2d 214, 217 (1964).
93. See note 8S supra. In states which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, an
assignment must be perfected in accordance with the requirements of the Code. United
States v. G. P. Fleetwood & Co., 165 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Pa. 1958). But f. Jacobs v.
Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 427-29, 206 A.2d 49, 54-55 (1965).
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surety with the right to use the plant, plant equipment, machinery, and
tools of the contractor. Without considering the surety's position where
bankruptcy does not intervene, it does not seem that the right thus out-
lined can be enforced in bankruptcy proceedings. The terminology of
such a clause is too general to constitute an agreement to lease, and,
even if this were not so, the trustee, endowed with the power to reject
executory contracts, 9 can so reject.
In some cases, the Federal Assignment of Claims Act'00 occupies a
controlling position. A 1910 case held that an assignment of a claim in
violation of that act was null and void, and that the contractor, therefore,
still owned the claim at the time of his bankruptcy, with title to such
claim passing to the trustee.101 Yet, later cases tended to hold that the
act was intended to benefit the Government only, rather than to regulate
the equities of other parties between themselves." 2 This necessarily as-
sumes, of course, that the assignment has been perfected under state law.
Without question, the Government can successfully raise the point if its
rights are involved.
B. Against the Government
It is not surprising that the bankruptcy court is frequently called upon
to determine the priority claim of a surety vis-h-vis the United States.
The Munsey case0 3 dealt with the Government's claim to set off, and on
that point the decision was not affected by the Pearlman case. 04 Trouble-
some questions arise where the surety bases its claim upon an assign-
ment of current funds due; the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four per
curiam decision, has held that such an assignment cannot be construed
as a mortgage within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, 10 that
the surety's rights rest upon an inchoate lien and are, therefore, inferior
to a federal tax lien dating subsequent to the assignment.100 The result
99. Bankruptcy Act § 70b, 76 Stat. 571 (1962), 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1964).
100. Rev. Stat. § 3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1964).
101. National Bank of Commerce v. Downie, 218 U.S. 345 (1910).
102. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 369 (1945); Martin v. National Sur.
Co., 300 U.S. 588, 594-95 (1937); M. M. Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 923, 926-27
(5th Cir. 1955); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 222 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D. Ore.
1963) ; Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 736, 746, 93 F. Supp. 891, 894 (1950).
103. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947), discussed at notes 39-52
supra and accompanying text.
104. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962), discussed at notes 53-67 and
accompanying text.
105. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323 (a).
106. United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (per curiam). The
facts of the case and the majority's holding underwent detailed examination in the dissent-
ing opinion.
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may be different where the assignment relates to the retainage, partic-
ularly where the amount is so determined that it cannot be construed as
inchoate.
V. THE TRUSTEE'S INJUNCTIVE rEMrEDY
Consideration of the respective rights of the trustee of the bankrupt
contractor's estate and of the surety involved in the bankrupt's projects
would be incomplete without reference to the trustee's right, if any, to
enjoin the surety from the pursuit of his rights in tribunals other than
the bankruptcy court.
After adjudication, the bankruptcy court is invested with exclusive
jurisdiction, dating from the filing of the petition, over all of the property
of which the bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy bad possession, actual
or constructive; and such exclusive jurisdiction gives to the court the
right and the duty to determine the persons entitled to that property.'" 7
Such determination may be made in a summary proceeding."", This rule
cannot be applied to funds, such as funds in trust, to which the bankrupt
had no right of possession." ' Since the bankruptcy court has such
jurisdiction, unless it is voluntarily relinquished, the judge has the power
to enjoin the surety's prosecution of actions to recover funds in the
class of cases that have been under discussion;"" and whether the actions
were instituted before or after the commencement of the bankruptcy
proceeding is not material. Some courts, upon the entry of an order
of adjudication, have ordered the funds under their immediate control
to be transmitted to the trustee. It is not difficult to foresee that in similar
cases some courts may refuse to do this, thus resulting in unfortunate
conflicts. However, it is also true that, when a valid lien has been ac-
quired more than four months prior to bankruptcy, the trustee will be
foreclosed from attacking it."'
VI. CONCLUSION
In spite of the mass of accumulated case law applicable to the re-
spective rights of trustees in bankruptcy, sureties, federal and state
governments, and other parties in interest, it appears that many existing
107. In re Weston, 6S F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1934); American Sur. Co. v. Owens, 65 F2d
190 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
108. Street v. Pacific Indem. Co., 61 F.2d 106, 103 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 297
U.S. 718 (1936). But see In re G. L. Odell Constr. Co., 119 F. Supp. 573 (D. Colo. 1954),
which is not supported by the cases therein cited.
109. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 206 F. Supp. 94 (D. Ore. 1962).
110. Bankruptcy Act §§ 2a(15), 67a(4), 52 Stat. S43, 376 (1933), 11 U.S.C. §§ 11(a) 1s).
107(a) (4) (1964).
111. Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 322 (1931).
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problems want of solution. Perhaps a theory supporting the concept of
subrogation will soon be evolved upon which all can agree. Assuredly,
new causes of litigation will be arising constantly. The impact of the
Uniform Commercial Code is certain to be substantial and, while its
statutory provisions are generally uniform, diversity of decisions is not
a difficult prediction. The future will be awaited by the surety companies
with some measure of trepidation, and by referees and trustees in bank-
ruptcy with a considerable measure of perplexity.
